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FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
VOLUME XI MAY, 1942 NUMBER 2
THE BETHLEHEM STEEL CASE-A TEST OF THE
NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM I.
WALTER B. KENNEDYt
T HE concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter in Graves v. O'Keefe,'
'delivered three short years ago, contains prophetic words which
herald the arrival of the New Constitutionalism, to be shaped and
moulded by a new Supreme Court. Herein the learned Justice pointed
out that "... an important shift in constitutional doctrine is announced
after a reconstruction in the membership of the Court."' His announce-
ment of an impending change in Constitutional doctrine, directed solely
to the issues of the Graves case and written before the complete "recon-
struction" of the Supreme Court, was an accurate prediction that further
and sweeping erasures of antiquated Constitutional law might be ex-
pected; the promise has now been translated into performance.3
The Graves pronouncement fortunately outlined the judicial formula
which Justice Frankfurter indorsed in the accomplishment of these shifts
in our organic law. He said:
"Such shifts of opinion should not derive from mere private judgment. They
must be duly mindful of the necessary demands of continuity in civilized
society. A reversal of a long current of decisions can be justified only if
rooted in the Constitution itself as an historic document designed for a develop-
ig nation. ' 4
Combining in his prescription for the judicial process the requirements
of stability of precedents and the limitation of reversals to those which
are imbedded in the roots of the Constitution, Justice Frankfurter set
down in Graves v. O'Keefe, a clear, but necessarily abbreviated, caveat
t Professor of Law, Fordham University, School of Law.
This paper will be divided into tiyo Parts. The subsequent Part vill consider other
phases of the New Constitutionalism-and of the Bethlehem Steel case.
1. 306 U. S. 466 (1939).
2. Id. at 487.
3. See infra notes 6-15.
4. Graves v. O'Keefe, supra note 1 at 487-488.
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against unbridled and unrestrained judicial action derived "from mere
private judgment".
With this prediction of Constitutional changes in mind, and with a
constant focus upon the stated judicial techniques to be followed in
bringing about these changes, it is timely to consider herein some of the
judicial and extra-judicial results and accomplishments of the New Con-
stitutionalism to date. Following a general and brief survey of the
beginnings of the New Constitutionalism, in judicial decisions and in
juristic writings, our main purpose will be to examine United States v.
Bethlehem Steel Corporation5-a test case which seems to provide a
juristic proving-ground to evaluate the comparative qualities of the
Old and the New Constitutionalism.
I
THE NEw CONSTITUTIONALISM
What is the New Constitutionalism? This term naturally connotes a
departure from Old Constitutionalism, the beginning of a new juristic
era, the overthrow of old landmarks. It is formed of many legal
philosophies and theories, not all consistent one with the others, not
all present in the same degree or at the same time.' The legal reforma-
tion had its modest start many years ago. It was accelerated by the
Depression Decade and its many social and economic problems. The
advent of the World War II has rapidly hastened the development of
a new jural order. It is not necessary for our purposes to review fully
the different stages which mark the jural crescendo of the New Con-
stitutionalism, nor to attempt to evaluate the personal contributions of
the progressive and liberal jurists who entered into its making.'
5. 62 Sup. Ct. 581, 86 L. Ed. 521 (1942).
6. Albertsworth, The New Constitutionalism (1940) 26 A. B. A. J. 865; Powell, Chang-
ing Constitutional Phases (1939) 19 B. U. L. REv. 509; Hamilton, Special Competence of
the Supreme Court (1941) 50 YALE: L. J. 1319; Rottschaefer, The Constitution and a
"Planned Economy" (1940) 38 MIcH. L. REv. 1133.
7. The names Holmes and Brandeis, JJ., stand forth as pioneers in the New Constitu-
tionalism with Cardozo, J. contributing in his all too brief career on the Supreme Court.
It was not until the arrival of Frankfurter, J., and the full complement of seven new jus-
tices that the new approach was assured.
The advent of Justice Frankfurter continues the tradition of the scholar on the Supreme
Court and gives a literary touch to the judicial opinions of the new era. Deeply grounded
in Constitutional and Administrative law by virtue of his many years of teaching and
writing in these fields, he combines, in a substantial degree, the rare talents of his dis-
tinguished predecessors and mentors, Justices Holmes, Brandeis and Cardozo. Infra, pp.
165-167. Kennedy, Book Review (1940) 9 FORDHAiti L. REV. 152.
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It suffices to sum up the current trends by pointing briefly to some
of the new principles and standards applied by the Court, or supplied
by commentators-all loosely gathered together under the broad cap-
tion, New Constitutionalism.
The noteworthy elements of the New Constitutionalism are:
(1) A vigorous rejection of the theory that the Supreme Court should
act as a Super-legislature in the review of Federal or State legislation.'
(2) A similar denial that pronouncements of Governmental "poli-
cies", evidenced by Congressional statute or Presidential decree, are
subject to review or reversal apart from the clear invasion of Constitu-
tional principles.9
(3) A strong defense of "freedom of communication" of ideas even
in the face of unambiguous legislative mandate directed to the curtail-
ment of such freedom of expression. 0
8. The stand-by policy of the Supreme Court in the review of Federal or State legisla-
tion has been particularly pronounced in the field of taxation law. Madden v. Kentucky,
309 U. S. 83, 88 (1940); Whitney v. State Tax Commission of New York, 309 U. S. 530,
541 (1940); Illinois Central Railroad v. Minnesota, 309 U. S. 157, 161 (1940). Nash,
What Law of Taxation? (1940) 9 FoRu)xr L. Rav. 165.
For an eloquent defense of flexibility of procedure in modern administrative tribunals,
divorced from "conventional judicial modes", see Frankfurter, J., in Federal Communica-
tion Commission v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U. S. 134, 142 (1940).
9. Powell, Some Aspects of American Constitutional Law (1940) 53 H~Av. L. Rav. 529;
Albertsworth, Current Constitutional Fashions (1940) 34 ILL. L. REv. 519; Willis, Constitu-
tion Making by the Supreme Court Since March 29, 1937 (1940) 15 IND. L. J. 179.
It has been contended that the new Court has not wholly abandoned consideration of
"policies" of legislatures or executives. Powell, id at 1547; Hamilton and Braden, The
Special Competence of the Supreme Court (1941) 50 YALE L. J. 1319, 1357.
10. Johnson, Post-War Protection of Freedom of Opinion (1940) 1 WASH. AND LEE L.
REV. 192; cf. Wright, Religious Liberty Under the Constitution of the United States'(1940)
27 VA. L. REv. 75.
One of the difficulties with the pronounced formula of "let-alone-ism" of the New Court
is that the stated policy is not uniformly applied, notably in the free-speech cases. Legisla-
tion aiming to regulate free speech and civil liberties finds the going hard when it strikes
the Supreme Court. Lerner has been bothered, and Powell and Hamilton too, by this
"fault-line" between the Holmesian theory of judicial self-restraint in the broad field of
experimental legislation and the contrary trend in civil liberty decisions. LmNE, IDEAS AS
WEAPoNs (1939) 67-68; Powell, op. cit. supra, notes 6, 9; Hamilton, op. cit. supra, note 6.
The confusion has been intensified with the arrival of Minersville School District v. Gobitis,
310 U. S. 586 (1940).
Is freedom of conscience less durable judgmatically than "freedom of communication"?
The Court refused to interfere with the compulsory flag salute, and stated: "Judicial re-
view, itself a limitation on popular government, is a fundamental part of our constitutional
scheme. But to the legislature no less than to courts is committed the guardianship of
1942]
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(4) An ardent belief in the power of the people to rectify errors of
Executive or Congressional policies by way of the ballot box; and a
general indorsement of a "hands-off" policy by the judiciary."1
(5) A tendency to fill in void spots in legislation and to supply the
unwritten, but probable, intent of law-making bodies. 2
(6) A gradual relaxation of the doctrine of stare decisis,'3 an en-
larged faith in fact-finding, 4 and a decided skepticism regarding the
deeply-cherished liberties." (id. at 600) Justice (now Chief Justice) Stone alone dis-
sented: "But it is a long step, and one which I am unable to take, to the position that
government may, as a supposed educational measure and as a means of disciplining the
young, compel public affirmations which violate their religious conscience." (id. at 602).
Commentators in the law reviews have indorsed his vigorous dissent. (1940) 20 B. U.
L. REV. 356; (1940) 14 So. CALtr. L. REV. 56; (1940) 14 U. or Cin. L. REv. 444; (1940)
18 N. Y. U. L. Q. REV. 124; (1940) 39 MIcH. L. REv. 149; (1940) 14 TKM'. L. Q. 545;
(1940) 4 DETROIT L. REV. 38; (1940) 15 ST. Jomq's L. REV. 95; (1940) 29 GEo. L. J. 114;
(1941) 6 Mo. L. REv. 106. The reviews center their criticism of the Gobitis case at the
level of the issue of freedom of speech versus freedom of conscience. See also Constitu-
tionality of the Compulsory Flag Salute, BrF oF COMMTTEE ON TE BILL or RIGHTs oF
THE AwRjcA BAR AssocIATOx (1940); The Gobitis Case in Retrospect, (1941) 1 THE
BILL OF RIGH-TS REV. 267; Burke, The Founding Fathers and the Bill of Rights, 1791-1941,
SoME PHAsEs OF Ai%=ivcA CuLTURE (1942) 35-36.
Cf. the recent case of Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 62 Sup. Ct. 766 (1942) which up-
holds a New Hampshire statute prohibiting the use of "any offensive, derisive or annoying
word", directed to one who is lawfully in any street or public place. The restrictive
statute was upheld because such offensive utterances form no necessary part of the exposi-
tion of ideas. The decision is helpful in delimiting more sharply the above stated policy
of the Supreme Court to leave open the channels of communication for the advocacy of
political or social changes. But the case in nowise narrows the chasm which divides the
Gobitis case from the civil liberties decisions.
11. Professor Dowing has emphasized the stated tendency as an important feature
of Chief Justice Stone's approach to Constitutional questions. The Methods of Mr. Justice
Stone in Constitutional Cases (1941) 41 COL. L. REV. 1160. But cf. supra, note 10.
12. This principle of judicial "interpretation" of legislation is well expressed by Holmes,
J., in Johnson v. United States, 163 Fed. 30, 32 (1908). Justice Frankfurter refers to the
above case as a "pioneer expression" of inferences to be drawn from legislative policy.
Keifer v. R. F. C., 306 U. S. 381, 391n (1939). For a recent use of the same formula,
see Frank, J., dissenting in M. Witmark & Sons v. Fred Fisher Music Co. Inc., 125 F.
(2d) 949, 969 (1942).
13. Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106, 122 (1940). Cf. Roberts, J., dissenting id. at
123; Pound, Individualization of Justice (1938) 7 FoRDHAM L. REV. 153; Pound, What of
Stare Decisis? (1941) 10 FORD A L. REv. 1; Wilkinson, Some Aspects of the Constitutional
Guarantees of Civil Liberty (1942) FORDUTA L. Rv. 50.
14. The judicial use of fact finding dates back at least to Muller v. Oregon, 208 U. S.
412 (1908) when Mr. Louis D. (later Justice) Brandeis filed one of the first "fact-finding"
briefs. Mr. Felix (now Justice) Frankfurter Was closely associated with Mr. Brandeis in
this commendable development. Frankfurter, Hours of Labor And Realism in Constitu-
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validity or permanency of pernicious abstractions or sterile concepts,
handed down the ages without any reconsideration of their present-day
value.'5
One must begin an analysis of the New Constitutionalism with a
genuine and deserved tribute for its insistent expression of the limitation
of judicial power within the framework of the Federal Constitution. The
old evil of the United States Supreme Court acting as a Super-legis-
lature, occasionally translating into judicial decisions the personalzed
viewpoint of the Justices, turning back meritorious and needed economic
and social reforms, and reviewing questions of legislative expediency and
wisdom under the guise of constitutional interpretation-all these short-
comings of the old order have been under attack. During the past few
years the accelerated tempo of the new Supreme Court has registered
judicial victories over extreme formalism and complacent quietism in
the realms of public law. 6
But eternal problems of law long antedating the New Constitutional-
ism are now coming forth to confront the New Court. Is there any
limit to the expansive juridical boundaries which are marked by the
title-New Constitutionalism? Is there any danger that the new and
reconstructed Court may forget the wise Words of Chief Justice Stone
warning of the need for self restraint? 17 Are there any indications that'
the human frailties incident to the tenure of the "Nine Old Men" may
return and find lodgment beneath judicial gowns of their more youthful
successors?
It would indeed be surprising if the rapid and cataclysmic "shift in
constitutional doctrine", predicted by Justice Frankfurter in the Graves
case, failed to produce temporary abnormalities or enthusiastic over-
emphasis upon the advantages of change in legal principles versus the
disadvantages of stability of precedents. The horse-and-buggy era of
tional Law (1916) 29 HARv. L. REv. 353. For a collection of recent cases using the fact-
approach in deciding issues of Constitutional law, see DODD, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW (1941) 83-85.
15. For example, see Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106, 118 (1940).
16. Supra, notes 6, 8, 9.
17. "The power of courts to declare a statute unconstitutional is subject to two guiding
principles of decision which ought never to be absent from judicial consciousness. One is
that courts are concerned only with the power to enact statuteS, not with their wisdom.
The other is that while unconstitutional exercise of power by the executive and legislative
branches of the government is subject to judicial restraint, the only check upon our own
exercise of power is our own sense of self-restraint." Stone, J., dissenting in United States
v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 78-79 (1936).
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Constitutional law is gone forever, replaced by a motorized model, New
Constitutionalism, streamlined and knee-actioned, attuned and adjusted
to meet the political, social and economic upheavals of our war-torn
world. But let us not forget that the instrument boards of our fastest
"P-40's" still contain an altimeter and a direction finder; the magic voice
of radio spells bedlam unless grooved and channeled to serve the cause
of "freedom of communication" among nations and men. If we are
"on our way" it is in order occasionally to inquire where we are going
lest-matching the epochal air journey of one Corrigan-we belatedly
discover that we have been progressing backwards.
Such long established custom of review of judicial decisions, temper-
ately undertaken,"8 supported by pertinent authorities and construc-
tively developed, is of the very essence of the American "way of life"-
and law;19 it distinguishes our Constitutionalism, Old or New, from
the sordid and debased power-philosophy of law which marks the dic-
tator nations.
There are gradual and growing indications that a survey of the lawful
metes and bounds of the New Constitutionalism is under way. Begin-
ning with the reasoned and increasing dissents of the learned Justices
of the'Supreme Court,20 supplemented by the pointed criticisms of com-
18. Justice Frankfurter has finely phrased this freedom to review judicial decisions of
the Supreme Court: "Judicial exegesis is unavoidable with reference to an organic act like
our Constitution, drawn in many particulars with purposed vagueness so as to leave room
for the unfolding future. But the ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitu-
tion itself and not what we have said about it". Graves v. O'Keefe, 306 U. S. 466, 491-
492 (1939). See also FRA4NKFURTER, LAw AND PoLiTics (1939) 41. The same thought is
eloquently expressed by Chief Justice Hughes at the Exercises Celebrating the One Hundred
and Fiftieth Anniversary of the Supreme Court, with the added admonition that the Jus-
tices do not write their opinions " . . . with the freedom of casual critics or even of
studious commentators, but under the pressure and within the limits of a definite official
responsibility." 309 U. S. XIII, XIV (1940). Elsewhere the Chief Justice warns against
intemperate criticism of the judiciary and the avoidance of an attitude approaching arro-
gance in the analysis of judicial opinions by eminent legal experts. Hughes, Foreword
(1941) 50 YALE L. J. 737-738; cf. Hamilton, Trial by Ordeal, New Style (1941) 50 YALE
L. J. 778.
19. "It is fortunate and not regrettable that the avenues of criticism are open to all
whether they denounce or praise. This is a vital part of the democratic process." Hughes,
C. J., Exercises Celebrating the One Hundred and Fiftieth Anniversary of the Supreme
Court, 309 U. S. XIII (1940); see Taney, C. J., in Passenger Cases, 48 U. S. 283, 470
(1849).
20. A recent popular survey proclaims the beginning of a new minority and the growth
of a new conservatism in the Supreme Court. The writer lists Chief Justice Stone and
Justice Roberts on the conservative side; and Justices Douglas and Black on the liberal
1942] THE BETHLEHEM STEEL CASE
mentators, - the time is approaching when a tentative appraisal of danger
zones may be ventured, which the New Constitutionalism must avoid in
order to continue its formidable record of Constitutional revivification.
II
THE BETHLEHEM STEEL CASE
Seasonally there has appeared in the course of Constitutional history
pivotal decisions, "great cases"2 2 which invite an evaluation of a chain
of related decisions, an estimate of current Constitutional trends, and
perhaps a modest attempt to forecast coming juristic weather. 3
United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corporation24 is such a case: a
crossroads decision to try out some of the formulas of the New Constitu-
tionalism. Here is a case which offers a tentative proving-ground to test
the current theories that the Supreme Court should not act as a Super-
legislature; that Governmental "policies" should not be reviewed by
judicial bodies; and that ancient precedents must prove their worth
in the new era or be discarded.
Herein also will be found indications of the limits of the new legal
liberalism; a stalwart defense of the doctrine of stare decisis invoked
side. Justice Frankfurter is generally aligned with the conservative Justices, while Justice
Murphy is said to favor the liberal viewpoint. Justices Reed, Byrnes and Jackson are
placed "in the middle ground". Shift in Supreme Court: The New Conservatism, UNITED
STATES NEWS, April 17, 1932, at 19-20.
The force of such an ambitious attempt to label the "liberal" or "conservative" tendencies
of the Justices is considerably limited. The most significant item is the following state-
ment: "The Chief Justice has dissented 14 times this term. On nine of these dissents, Mr.
Stone has been teamed with Justice Roberts. Justice Douglas has 15 dissents for the term,
12 of these with Justice Black. Not a single dissent of the term has found either Stone
or Roberts lined up on the dissenting side with either Douglas or Black." Id. at 19.
21. See Professor Powell's vigorous criticism of the judicial decisions of the Supreme
Court in his recent articles because of the neglect of the Supreme Court to cite "apposite
precedents". See supra, note 6, at 520; note 9, at 550.
22. This expression is used by Justice Holmes in United States v. Northern Securities
Company, 193 U. S. 197, 400 (1904).
23. A partial list of " great cases" might contain the following: Trustees of Dartmouth
College v. Woodward, 17 U. S. 518 (1819); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U. S. 316 (1819);
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U. S. 23 (1824); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U. S. 393 (1857); Able-
man v. Booth, 62 U. S. 506 (1859); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U. S. 36 (1873); Lochner
v. New York, 198 U. S. 45 (1905); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925);
Graves v. O'Keefe, 306 U. S. 466 (1939). These cases-are not "great" for the same reason.
Some of them continue their greatness down the years; others merely mark a point of
departure, actual or threatened.
24. 62 Sup. Ct. 581, 86 L. Ed. 521 (1942).
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to stay an understandable urge to overthrow "historic liberties" in re-
sponse to righteous indignation and public disdain; a commendable ex-
ample of jtidicial courage and restraint which resisted an "accident of
immediate overwhelming interest", weighed the importance of the con-
tinuity of "well settled principles of law" against the "impulse of the
moment", and proposed the correction of the morals of the market place
not by an unwise extension of the judicial power, but by "the enactment
of a statute in accordance with established forms."'
So stating the jural ingredients of the Bethlehem litigation, about to
be analyzed in detail, it satisfies the "great-case" specifications as defined
by Justice Holmes,26 pioneer and exemplar of the New Constitutionalism.
The Bethlehem case takes on an added significance and potential in-
portance when it is noted that the litigation dates back to World War I
and brings up for final judicial review penetrating legal problems which
may be repeated, and indeed exceeded, in our own day and place. By
one of those strange coincidences of time, the case was argued in the
Supreme Court on December 9, 1941, two days after Pearl Harbor and
one day after the declaration of war by the United States on Japan.
The basic facts of United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corporation7 are
in the main easily and simply stated; the doubts- and disputes arising
out of this litigation in all its manifold stages center about the under-
lying questions of law. Subject to specific enlargement in the following
pages, the basic facts may now be set down.28
25. The interspersed quotations have been taken from two opinions: (1) Holmes, J.,
dissenting in Northern Securities Company v. United States, 193 U. S. 197, 400 (1904) and
(2) Matter of Doyle, 257 N. Y. 244, 268 (1931).
26. Supra, note 25, at 400.
27. There were two cases before the Court. In No. 8, the Government filed a bill in
equity against the following parties: Bethlehem Steel Corporation, Bethlehem Shipbuilding
Corporation, Ltd., Bethlehem Steel Company, Fore River Shipbuilding Corporation, Union
Iron Works Company. The bill alleged fraud and failure of the duty of the Bethlehem
Shipbuilding Corporation to perform the contracts for a fair and reasonable profit. The
prayer of the bill was for an accounting. The Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corporation filed an
answer and a counterclaim for damages based on an alleged breach of contract by the
Fleet Corporation.
In No. 9, Bethlehem brought a suit at law against the Fleet Corporation claiming dam-
ages for breach of the same contracts. The two actions were jointly referred by the
District Court to a Master. It suffices for present purposes to state that the Master, the
Federal District Court and the Circuit Court of Appeals found in substance for Bethlehem
on all the material issues of law.
28. All page references to United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corporation in the text or
footnotes are taken from the Supreme Court Reporter. All references to the individual
opinions in the Bethlehem case mention merely the particular Justice with a citation of the
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The Facts
During World War I, the United States Shipping Board Emergency
Fleet Corporation (hereinafter called the "Fleet Corporation") entered
into thirteen wartime contracts with the Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corpo-
ration, Ltd. (hereinafter called "Bethlehem") for the construction of
ships. The contracts followed the formula of negotiation relied upon
by the Fleet Corporation and other Government agencies at the time2 9
The particular provisions of the contracts, determining the method of
fixing the prices, were as follows:
"The price to be paid for each vessel to be constructed and furnished in
accordance with the terms of this contract ... shall be the actual cost, plus the
definite sum for profit hereinafter in this Article provided for, based upon an
estimated base cost to the Contractor .... Should the actual cost be less than
the estimated . .. cost . . . the Contractor shall be allowed as profit on each
vessel in addition to said fixed sum for profit . . one-half the amount by
which suck actual cost of each vessel falls short of the estimated cost. .... ,,3o
appropriate page. All references to the Government's Brief or Bethlehem's Brief will be
abbreviated as follows: Government's Brief (G. B.), Bethlehem's Brief (B. B.). The
Record of the Bethlehem case in the Circuit Court of Appeals (containing the Special
Master's Report, Exhibits, Testimony, etc.), will be referred to as: (R.); and the Concession
of Documentary Evidence (containing copies of contracts, letters, etc.), will be referred to
as: (C. D. E.).
29. Black, J., at 583.
In the present World War II, the same "marked tendency to enter into contracts by
negotiation rather than through competitive bidding" is present, and a formidable list of
reasons for such preference is given by Naval Officers. Investigation of the Naval Defense
Program, PRELm INARY REPORT oF THE COArMTTEE oN NAVAL APfAms, H. R. REP. No.
1634, PART II, 108-111. (Italics Added).
30. Black, J., at 585-586 (Italics Added); cf. Frankfurter, J. dissenting at 596-598.
This tri-partite method of fixing the price is somewhat lie the "target-cost" type of war
contract, aptly so called because it aims at an estimated cost--"target" and is said to pro-
vide an incentive to cheap production-costs because the resultant "savings" are shared by
Government and contractor. This form of contract is now used in Great Britain. "It
works in that indeterminate stage during which a more exact knowledge is being built
up." Investigation of the National Defense Program, ADnmoNAL REPORT, TRumAm Com-
ITTEE, H. R. REP. No. 480, PART 5 (January 15, 1942) supra, note 29, at 112-115. Black,
J., at 588, pointed out the similar difficulty of predetermining exact costs due to "rising
prices and unpredictable labor supply" in the Bethlehem case.
It is said that Powell, Vice President of Bethlehem, had originated the "half-savings"
form of contract [Frankfurter, J., dissenting at 595] or was the author. of it in this case
[Douglas, J., at 605]. But cf. Uniform Contracts and Cost Accounting Definitions and
Methods (Prepared by the United States Government and published in July, 1917, for use
in the making of war contracts) pp. 5-6. Cf. note 33, infra.
1942]
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The italicized clause of the contracts provided the core of the en-
suing litigation and is frequently mentioned in the four opinions of the
six Justices who participated in the case. Out of this clause came the
dominant issues of duress, unconscionable conduct, fiduciary relation-
ship and the divisibility of the contracts. This clause likewise marks the
scope of the present analysis of the Bethlehem decision.
The creation and exercise of Governmental power to enter into said
contracts was derived by the Fleet Corporation mediately from Con-
gress and immediately from the President, who was granted sweeping
war powers by the Congress." Three alternative methods were given by
the Congress to the President in its formation of legislative policies
regarding the emergency shipbuilding program:
"(1) the power to commandeer shipbuilding plants and facilities,
"(2) the power to purchase ships at what he deemed a reasonable price
with a provision for subsequent revision by the courts in the event the seller
regarded the price set as unfair, and
"(3) the power to purchase or contract for the building of ships at prices
to be established by negotiation.'8 2
After due deliberation the Fleet Corporation elected to forego the
delegated Legislative options (1) to seize the shipbuilding plants; or
(2) to fix a reasonable price for the purchase of ships subject to judicial
review. Instead, the Fleet Corporation exercised the third method
allowed by Congress and chose to negotiate with shipbuilding compa-
nies at the level of commercial bargaining."
31. Black, J., at 584. Holmes, J., in Sloan Shipyards Corporation v. United States
Fleet Corporation, 258 U. S. 549, 565-566 (1922) gives the history of the legislation of
Congress establishing the Fleet Corporation, subsequently enlarging its powers, and resulting
in the creation of a Governmental agency, "with enormous powers". The significance of
the nature and extent of the powers vested in the Fleet Corporation will be later developed.
Infra, pp. 153-157.
32. Black, J., at 584. (Italics added.)
33. Black, J., at 584. In view of the focal issue of "duress" and the confusing question
of judicial power to review Governmental policies by the Supreme Court, (both problems
to be later developed, infra, pp. 148-153 and pp. 157-162) it is important to note the
chronology of events leading up to the making of the stated contracts.
The certificate of incorporation of the United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet
Corporation was dated April 16, 1917 under the sub-chapter 4 of the incorporation laws
of the District of Columbia (C. D. E. 592). The Fleet Corporation functioned as a skel-
eton organization until July 11, 1917, when the President, by virtue of powers conferred
by Congress on June 15, 1917, transferred to the Fleet Corporation all powers vested in
him to purchase or requisition vessels, built or building, and to contract for or requisition
new ships. (C. D. E. 632-633). This explains the anticipatory action of Fleet Corporation
[V/ol. 11
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This designated formula of free contract, to be used by Fleet Corpo-
ration in its dealing with the ship contractors, was carried into the nego-
tiations with Bethlehem. The main issue centered about price. The
Government first proposed and then abandoned a lump-sum arrangement
due to Bethlehem's reluctance to fix a static price in view of the un-
certainty of material and labor costs.3 4 Following a rejection by the
Fleet Corporation of a proposal by Bethlehem that the General Manager
of Fleet Corporation should fix the price m  the tri-partite provision
(actual cost, plus fixed fee, plus the "half-savings" clause) was incor-
porated into the contract.
The Bethlehem litigation, comprising two actions, was focused about
the amount legally due under the executed contracts.
The Government contended inter alki (1) that the so-called "bonus-
for-savings" clause was conditioned upon proof of actual "savings" in-
duced by special efforts and increased efficiency of Bethlehem; (2) that
the savings clause, if construed to permit Bethlehem to share in the
"savings" however caused, was void because of lack of consideration;
(3) that the profits obtained by Bethlehem were inordinate and exces-
sive; and (4) that the contracts were exacted through duress or un-
conscionable acts by Bethlehem.3 6
Bethlehem contended (1) that the language of the "half-savings"
clause regulating final payment is plain and unambiguous; (2) that the
"half-savings" provision is supported by ample consideration; (3) that
there was no duress; (4) that the contracts were not unconscionable;
in holding a preliminary meeting with shipbuilders on June 15, 1917, almost a month
before the transfer of war powers to Fleet Corporation by the President. (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting at 595).
Another chronological difficulty remains: When did Powell begin to "insist" on the
"half-savings" formula? Frankfurter, J., says "Throughout the entire negotiations which
followed [the first meeting between Bethlehem and the Fleet Corporation on June 15, 1917],
the Fleet Corporation tried to persuade Bethlehem to enter into 'lump-sum' contracts. Pow-
ell refused, insisting upon the so-called 'half-savings' form of contract which he had origi-
nated." The first written disclosure of the "half-savings" formula appears in Powell's
letter to the Emergency Fleet Corporation, dated December 13, 1917, six months after
the initial conference between Bethlehem and the Fleet Corporation, held on June 15, 1917.
(C. D. E. 201-202; cf. Frankfurter, J., dissenting at 595). There are indications that Pow-
ell, Vice President of Bethlehem, discussed orally the matter of the "half-savings" clause
with Piez, General Manager of the Fleet Corporation, before December 13, 1917. (R. 1333-
1337; 1352-1353).
34. Black, J., at 588; Frankfurter, J., dissenting at 595; G. B. at 6; B. B. at 60-61.
35. Black, J., at 588; Frankfurter, J., dissenting, at 595.
36. The four points are found in G. B. at 31, 42, 51, 63, 75.
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and (5) that the Government is asking the Supreme Court to exercise
a function of Congress in respect of the regulation of profits3 '
Lack of space plus the novelty and overpowering importance of the
charges by the United States of duress and unconscionable conduct
exerted by a private corporation necessitate a limitation to these stated
points,3 especially so because they provide an adequate "bridgehead"
from which to explore the contours of the New Constitutionalism and
the metes and bounds of judicial discretion in general.
But it may be helpful to make a few preliminary observations that
will serve to narrow and delimit the stated charges of duress against
the Government and unconscionable conduct by Bethlehem:
(1) The original charge by the United States that Bethlehem
was guilty of fraud in its negotiations with the United States, was
withdrawn, following a finding by the Master, approved by the Fed-
eral District Court and the Circuit Court of Appeals, that " 'the esti-
mates submitted by Bethlehem . . . were fairly and honestly made
and as accurate as could be expected under the uncertain conditions
then prevailing.' 9
(2) The exhibits offered in evidence by Bethlehem, "the accu-
racy of which the government has not challenged," indicate that the
profits made by Bethlehem in the instant case were not exceptional
for wartime industries.40
(3) The "generously inclusive formula" for determining "actual
cost", which was used in contracts with other shipbuilders by the
Fleet Corporation, eliminated all risk of financial loss by Bethlehem.41
(4) All of the Justices participating in this case were indignant at
Bethlehem's claim of 22% profit.
(5) The Justices likewise agreed that the Government had power
to rectify the statutory loop-holes which permitted the use of such
an objectionable method of fixing prices in war contracts, but dif-
fered as to the proper Department of Government constitutionally or
37. The five points are found in B. B. at 22, 52, 58, 70, 77.
38. The principal point omitted is the question whether the "half-savings" clause was
divisible so that Bethlehem could not recover its part of the "savings" without proof that
the savings resulted from its increased efficiency. Justice Douglas so argued. Douglas, J.,
at 604-607; cf. Black, J., at 586-587.
It is intended to discuss the contract question and other problems of the Bethlehem case
in a later installment. See infra, note 109.
39. Black, J., at 586.
40. Black, J., at 590-591; cf. Frankfurter, I., at 602.
41. Black, J., at 584; Frankfurter, J., at 598.
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legally authorized or empowered to initiate the corrective processes.
The prevailing Justices argued that the relief must be found in Con-
gress, while Justice Frankfurter in his scholarly dissenting opinion
contended that the Supreme Court could intervene to review and to
restrict the profits derived from the price-formula negotiated under
the circumstances disclosed in the Bethlehem litigation.42
Frequently in the past the "personal" equation entering into Consti-
tutional decisions by the Supreme Court has been emphasized by com-
mentators.43 A similar survey regarding the relation of the individual
Justices to the principal case deserves at least brief mention. Only six
Justices participated in the decision. The Chief Justice and Justice
Jackson took no part because of their association with the United
States as former Attorneys-General. Mr. Justice Roberts also withdrew
from the case. Of the remaining six Justices, Justice Black, delivered the
opinion of the Court, which rejected the Governmental charges of duress
and inequitable conduct. Justices Reed and Byrnes concurred. Justice
Murphy concurred in a separate opinion. Justice Douglas fully agreed
with the views expressed by Justice Black on the points of duress and
coercion, but dissented on the issue of divisibility or severability of the
"savings" clause of the contracts. Thus it appears that five of the six
sitting Justices rejected the contention of the United States that the
duress of Bethlehem dominated in the making of these wartime con-
tracts, Justice Frankfurter alone agreeing with the Government that the
claims of duress and unconscionable conduct were established. But the
voluntary withdrawal of three Justices, the partial dissent of Justice
Douglas and the carefully developed and ably argued dissent of Justice
Frankfurter presage the possibility of a later review by the full Court
of the penetrating and novel problems now to be examined.44 These
42. Black, J., at 591-592; cf. Frankfurter, J., passim.
43. Many attempts have been made to appraise former or present Justices of the
Supreme Court in terms of their economic and extra-legal views or lack of them. Cohen,
Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach (1935) 35 CoL. L. Rav. 809,
810-813. Cf. Kennedy, Functional Nonsense and the Transcendental Approach (1936) 5
FoaRnBu L. Rav. 272, 286-289; Cohen, Correspondence (1936) 5 FonH)AX L. REv. 548-
551; Kennedy, More Functional Nonsense-A Reply to Felix S. Cohen (1937) 6 FoRDHAM
L. REv. 75, 82-85.
For additional examples of present-day attempts to catalogue the Justices of the Su-
preme Court see the writer's paper Portrait of a Realist, New Style (1941) 10 FoRD
L. REv. 196, 202-203n, 204n. See also, Rodell, Felix Frankfurter, Conservative (1941) 183,
HARPERS IVIAGAZIN 449; Powell, Some Aspects of American Constitutional Law (1940)
53 HEARv. L. REv. 529, 535-536; supra, note 20.
44. The Bethlehem case is one of first impression, (Black, J., at 587), decided in the
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divisional factors in the Bethlehem decision cast a shadow upon the
permanency of the instant case as a binding authority.45
A Novel Contention
The first matter of importance in the consideration of the charge
of duress advanced by the United States against Bethlehem is the fact
that the stated defense was "the first instance", so far as the majority
of the Court were aware, "in which government has claimed to be a
victim of duress in dealings with an individual".4" Nor did the Govern-
ment's able Brief rdveal a case which squarely presents an established
claim of duress against Government in its contractual relations with an
individual or private corporation.
At the very outset, it therefore appears that the problem of stare
decisis enters the Bethlehem case and calls for brief consideration of a
doctrine long recognized in the history of Anglo-American law.48
absence of three Justices, and disclosing four opinions written by the six Justices who
participated. Cf. Frankfurter, J., in Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106, 119-122 (1940).
Cf. Stettler v. O'Hara, 243 U. S. 629 (1917) and Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S.
525 (1923). For additional comment and cases bearing upon the question of the force of
particular decisions as precedents, see BRANDT, HOW TO FIND Ta LAW (3d ed. 1940) 287-
297.
45. Justice Shientag recently offered a scholarly article on Lord Mansfield, which dis-
closes the long-continued effect of a dissenting viewpoint. Two centuries after his minority
opinions were delivered, American law, especially contract law, is translating his dissents
into current legislation. Shientag, Lord Mansfield Revisited-A Modern Assessment (1941)
10 FORDHAM! L. REv. 345, 361-368.
46. Black, J., at 587.
47. The closest line of cases mentioned by the Government seems to be the "salvage"
cases. G. B. at 63-75. These cases are considered later. Infra pp. 148-151.
48. The Bethlehem case is unusual in that it centers in the main about questions of
common law, rather than problems of Federal law, Constitutional or statutory. (Black, J.,
at 587, 590; Murphy, J., at 592; Douglas, J., at 604-606; Frankfurter, J., passim). The
fact that this is largely a common law decision and not one moving principally in the area
of Constitutional law is likewise evidenced by the kind of legal problems herein litigated
(e.g. divisibility of contract, duress, fiduciary relations, etc.). The importance of the rather
complete absence of Constitutional law in the Bethlehem case is due to the fact that there
is a greater degree of flexibility in the doctrines of Constitutional law than in the more
rigid common-law rules and principles. It is true, as Professor Frankfurter points out,
that "the Supreme Court has . . . ceased to be a common law court. The stuff of its
business is what on the continent is formally known as public law and not the ordinary
legal questions involved in the multitudinous lawsuits of Doe v. Roe of other courts."
FRANKFURTER, LAW AND POLrTICS (1939) 29. But this generalization is qualified occasion-
ally by the nature of the legal problems arising in the area of "public law". That the
Bethlehem Steel decision moves away from the field of Constitutional law into the area of
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How far should a Court go in the exercise of the judicial discretion
which has been variously defined as "judge-made law" or "judicial legis-
lation"? The ever present issue between legal stability and change, be-
tween adherence to precedents and the urge to improve rules and princi-
ples, defies definite solution in terms of a precise legal formula. One of
the simplest statements of the problem, outlining in a general way the
basic test to be applied, was first expressed by Dean Pound and re-
peated by Judge Cardozo: "Law must be stable and yet it cannot stand
still."49  The generalization is simple of statement but exceedingly diffi-
cult to apply in individual cases.
But there are helpful aids which deserve constant repetition, jural
sign-posts which warn against the dual dangers inherent in the judicial
process: the sudden and unconsidered departure from the settled stream
of precedents on the one hand,50 and the equally disastrous consequences
of a frozen formalism and static complacency which marks the ultra-
conservative position. A complete vacuum of legal precedents in the
vast warehouse of common law authorities accumulated after centuries
of controversial litigation, is a pertinent fact of no mean proportion. At
the very least, a plea for a revaluation of a settled principle enjoying
an age-old monopoly in the realms of judicial decisions, calls for careful
reflection and studied analysis before the ancient rule is materially
changed. The burden of proof properly rests upon the advocate or
judge who proposes substantial change in legal doctrine; classic legal
landmarks are at least entitled to the presumption of validity and a
"day in court".
With this review of common-law solidarity in mind, a deserved tribute
is due to the Supreme Court for its adherence to the doctrine of stare
decisis in a "hard case" which impelled the Justices without emotional
the common law must be considered a factor in appraising the extent of judicial discretion
allowable in the overthrow of old precedents. See Powell, supra note 9, at 534.
49. Dean Pound opens one of his well-known books with the stated sentence. POUND,
INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HiSTORY (1923) 1. Judge Cardozo begins and ends his THE
GRowTR or THE LAW (1924) 2, 143, with the same maxim.
50. No man has done more than justice Frankfurter to warn against precipitate accep-
tance of social and economic data without critical examination. FRANPKFURTER, LAW AND
PoLiTics (1939) 287-298.
The writer's article, A Review of Legal Realism (1940) 9 FORDHAn! L. REV. 362, deals
with this tendency to accept personalized and pseudo-scientific conclusions as sufficient
bases for the ouster of well-settled rules and principles of law. Obiter Dicta, Pragmatism in
Practice (1939) 8 FORDHmar L. REv. 136; Matter of del Drago, 287 N. Y. 61, 38 N. E. (2d)
131 (1941).
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enthusiasm to follow the path of the authorities in the belief that the
common good would be thereby enhanced and to reject pressing and
plausible reasons arguing for a departure from precedents. The follow-
ing pages will be devoted largely to a consideration of the enduring
wisdom and long-range soundness of the common-law principles courage-
ously upheld by the Supreme Court.
III
WAS THE GOVERNMENT UNDER DURESS?
In view of the admitted novelty and importance of the proposal to
include Government for the first time as a party protected in its deal-
ings with citizen or private corporation under the doctrine of common-
law duress, it is necessary to consider carefully the able and exhaustive
analysis of analogous authorities which mark the Brief of the Solicitor
General and the dissenting opinion of Justice Frankfurter in the Beth-
lehem case. Massing a formidable and varied collection of legal authori-
ties on the law of duress, the Government and Justice Frankfurter cited
a number of collateral catpgories in the law and analogies to support
the argument that the stated contracts were made under duress exerted
by Bethlehem against the United States.51 But one alleged parallel in-
stance of duress, emphasized by the Government, deserves special
mention.
"Traffic of Profit" versus "Public Duty"
A particular analogy invoked by the Government52 and stated by
Justice Frankfurter to be "strikingly analogous to the case at bar"53
came forth from the decisions of Courts of Admiralty which hold that
an agreement for salvage service to be rendered to a ship in distress is
subject to the close scrutiny of the Courts in order to relieve against
possible duress. A typical case mentioned by the United States and the
dissenting Justice is Post v. Jones, wherein the court said:
"They [the Admiralty Courts] will not tolerate the doctrine that a salvor
can take the advantage of his situation, and avail himself of the calamities of
51. G. B. at 63-75; Frankfurter, J., at 600-601. It is noteworthy, as further proof that
the Bethlehem case is one of first impression (supra, note 44), that neither the Government
nor the scholarly dissenting Justice was able to cite a case wherein the charge of duress
against a sovereign was sustained. The list of authorities regarding duress did not disclose
a single case where the strong arm of Government was atrophied by the forceful act or
domination of individual or corporation.
52. G. B. at 68-70.
53. Frankfurter, J., at 601; cf. Black, J., at 589.
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others to drive a bargain; nor will they permit the performance of a public
duty to be turned into a traffic of profit."'54
In the Post case the Court set aside a forced sale of the cargo of a vessel
stranded thousands of miles from port to the owners of nearby vessels
of the same fishing fleet. Another quotation from the Post case, which
was used in the Government's Brief,ss may be helpful in appraising the
emphasized analogy between the mariner in distress and the United
States in time of war:
"The contrivance of an auction sale, under such circumstances, where the
master of the Richmond was hopeless, helpless, and passive-where there was
no market, no money, no competition-where one party had absolute power,
and the other no choice but submission-where the vendor must take what is
offered or get nothing-is a transaction which has no characteristic of a valid
contract." 56
To liken the Fleet Corporation of the United States to the master of a
stranded vessel, whom the Court found to be "hopeless, helpless and
passive-where there was no market, no money, no competition" seems
to be highly debatable as a formidable analogy. To link Bethlehem
with the unconscionable salvor who "had absolute power", and to assim-
ilate the position of the Fleet Corporation with that of the unfortunate
shipmaster who "had no choice but submission" strains the Govern-
ment's analogic reasoning to a considerable degree. The demonstrable
differences between the Government and the "hopeless" shipmasker, and
between the Bethlehem Steel Corporation and the salvors, cast grave
doubts upon the Government's concluding contention that the law of
duress based upon economic pressure ". . . should be enforced with re-
doubled solicitude in the case of contracts entered into by the Govern-
ment under the compulsion of an overriding national emergency"."
54. Post v. Jones, 19 How. 150, 160 (U. S. 1857). This quotation was used by Justice
Frankfurter in his dissenting opinion at 601 (italics added) and the case was cited in G. B.
at 68.
55. G. B. at 69.
56. Supra, note 54, at 159.
57. G. B. at 70.
It is pertinent to note the apparent shift in the position of the Government in the
Bethlehem case on the matter of "economic pressure" from its position on "economic coer-
cion" in United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1 (1936). In the stated AAA case, the position
of the Government was that there was no duress asserted against the farmers because
they were free to accept or reject the permissive Governmental aid: "We distinguish, of
course, between the use of Federal money to coerce some action by an individual, and the
inducement to the individual." (Argument of the Solicitor General, at p. 12). See also
1942]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Courts of Admiralty very properly consider the contractual relations
arising out of the hazardous callings of those who go down to sea in
ships. Salvage contracts are subject to close scrutiny by the Admiralty
Courts and are closely scanned in accordance with rigid rules not ap-
plicable to suits at law or in equity. 8 Nor is this salutary principle
limited to salvage service. Seamen have long been treated as "wards of
Admiralty" by the protective arm of Government operating through
the Admiralty Courts."9
But there is a wide expanse of juristic waters between a ship stranded
at sea thousands of miles from its home port and the Ship of State sailing
the tempestuous seas of a "national emergency". As Chief Justice
Hughes stated in Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell:
the dissenting opinion of Stone, J.: "Threat of loss, not hope of gain, is the essence of eco-
nomic coercion." (p. 81).
Cf. the Government's Brief in the Bethlehem case: "These examples [of duress operating
against masters of vessels in distress] are but specific instances of a more pervasive
rule of general contract law that duress exists whenever the consequences of resisting
economic pressure to accept an unequal agreement would be catastrophic to the individual
and injurious to social interests deserving of protection." (G. B. 70) Cf. Frankfurter, J.,
at 599, in the Bethlehem case: "The fact that the representatives of the Government
entered into the contracts 'with their eyes wide open' does not mean that they were not
acting under compulsion."
It is respectfully submitted that the test of duress developed by Justice [now Chief
Justice] Stone, and apparently accepted by the Government in the AAA case, was not
invoked by the Government in the Bethlehem case. The "hope of gain" actuated the Fleet
Corporation, primarily at least, in electing to waive its authority to capture the ship-
building plants or to fix prices unilaterally subject to judicial review. (See Black, J. at
588).
This "hope of gain", wholly separated from "threat of loss", is still present in the formu-
lation of Governmental policies today. See Investigation of the Naval Defense Program,
PREr smnR Y REPORT, H. R. RE:P. No. 1634, Part I, p. 109, wherein the advantages of
negotiated war contracts are enumerated by Government experts.
58. The Tornado, 109 U. S. 110 (1883); The Elfrida, 172 U. S. 186 (1898).
59. Bonici v. Standard Oil Co., 103 F. (2d) 437 (1939); Sitchon v. American Export
Lines, 113 F. (2d) 830 (1940); Hume v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 121 F. (2d) 336 (1941).
The Hume case defends the status of a seaman as a "ward of admiralty" and the right of
the Court to reject a release signed by the seaman without counsel or independent adviser.
judge Frank, writing for an unanimous court, stresses the power of Government rather
than its feebleness. He says: "The hand that guided national defense must be visible and
forceful; the nation's very existence being at stake, there was no room, when it came to
sea-power, for the minimalist dogma that the best government is invariably that which
governs the least". (Frank, J., at 345). judge Clark in the Bonici case, supra, traces back
the rule of "wards of admiralty" to the " . . . tender consideration of admiralty for these
'favorites' of the court who are 'a class of persons remarkable for their rashness, thought-
lessness, and improvidence' . . . " (Clark, J., at 438.)
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"While emergency does not create power emergency may furnish the
occasion for the exercise of power"."0 This now famous case, decided
in the early days of our- economic depression, upheld the right and power
of the individual states to protect their citizenry against "economic pres-
sure" in time of peace. Certainly this residual power of a State to save
itself in peace time is not lacking to the National Government in time
of war. Indeed, the Chief Justice cited the breadth of war powers to
sustain his argument that Government can meet and overcome emer-
gencies in time of peace:
"Thus, the war power of the Federal Government is not created by the
emergency of war, but it is a power given to meet that emergency. It is a
power to wage war successfully, and thus it permits the harnessing of the en-
tire energies of the people in a supreme coperative effort to preserve the
nation."6'
Concluding the alleged analogy offered by the Government between
the distressed ship at sea and the Ship of State in wartime, it is re-
spectfully submitted that distress of Government in wartime spells
power, constitutionally exercised and permitting "the harnessing of the
entire energies of the people"; its favored position is far removed from
that of the storm-tossed mariner at an auction sale. Certain it is that
the attempt to reduce the United States to the status of a "ward of Ad-
miralty" was properly and decisively rejected by the Supreme Court.6"
Government-Feeble or Strong?
The nub of the Bethlehem Steel case is focused about the curt refer-
ence by Justice Black to the "feebleness" of the United States in con-
trast with the "overpowering strength on the side of a single private
corporation". 3 Here is the heart of the legal problem: Is it true that
the complete scenario of the Bethlehem case depicts an enfeebled sover-
eign overcome by a mighty corporation? Justice Frankfurter meets the
issue squarely in the following words:
60. 290 U. S. 398, 426 (1934).
61. Ibid.
62. Black, J., at 589-590.
"Thou too, sail on, 0 Ship of State!
Sail on, 0 Union, strong and great!
Humanity, with all its fears,
With all its hopes of future years,
Is hanging breathless on thy fate !"
6 ONGFELLOW.63. Black, J'., at 587.
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"To deny the existence of duress in a Government contract by ironic refer-
ence to the feebleness of the United States as against the overpowering strength
of a single private corporation is an indulgence of rhetoric in disregard of fact.
The United States with all its might and majesty never makes a contract. To
speak of a contract by the United States is to employ an abstraction. We must
not allow it to become a blinding abstraction. Contracts are made not by 130
million Americans but by some official on their behalf."64
The juristic argument that the United States never makes a contract
is true in so far as it proclaims that the artificial entity we call the
United States of America acts, and must act, through its officials and
agencies, duly authorized to represent the sovereign. But it is respect-
fully suggested that the argument of the scholarly Justice proves too
much. Without more than formal changes, the quoted passage might be
lifted out of the text and used to describe the actions of the Bethlehem
Steel Corporation, a mighty entity and another abstraction, which has
never yet raised a pen to sign a contract. ' 5 The same realistic approach
leads to the conclusion that the hiatus which separates the United States
from its officers and citizens similarly divides Bethlehem from its offi-
cials, stockholders and employees.
Avoiding the many conflicting theories of the nature of a state, its
relation to people and the source of its power,66 it is respectfully sub-
mitted that the realistic severance of the United States from its author-
ized agencies is questionable; a contract with the United States is no
mere abstraction. Even in the realms of practicality and realism, the
sovereign power of the United States is at least latent throughout the
preliminary negotiations, concededly opposed by the might and strength
of the Bethlehem Corporation, both acting through legally authorized
agencies. The panoply of power, corporate or Governmental, does not
fall so easily from the individual agencies or representatives of the two
64. Frankfurter, J., at 601.
65. Elsewhere in his opinion, Justice Frankfurter states the fact that "Bethlehem was
the largest shipbuilding company in the world." (Frankfurter, J., at 593-594.)
66. See Justice Holmes' opinion in Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U. S. 349 (1907);
cf. Frankfurter, J., in Keifer v. R. F. C., 306 U. S. 381, 388n (1939). Judge Frank has
recently reviewed the origin of the maxim "The King Can Do No Wrong" and contends
that the insulation of the Government from actions by its citizens does not derive out of
the classic phase. Hammond-Knowlton v. United States, 121 F. (2d) 192, 204-206 (1941).
Incidentally, the opinion of Judge Frank in the Hammond case seems to follow the position
of the prevailing Justices in the Bethlehem case on the issues of stare decisis, suability of
the Fleet Corporation, judicial protection of the interests of the citizen in relation to the
Government, etc. Hammond case, passim.
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contracting parties; they carry into their give-and-take bargaining the
strength and greatness of their respective organizations.
Status of the Fleet Corporation
In -view of Government's attempt to insulate the United States from
liability in the Bethlehem case on the ground that "the Government
agents were without authority to enter the contracts167 and the conten-
tions of the learned dissenting Justice that the United States is an ab-
straction which never makes a contract and enjoys the immunity of a
sovereign in situations wherein a private party might be bound,68 it is
important to consider the nature, origin, powers, and liabilities of the
Fleet Corporation. It is believed that such a study will disclose addi-
tional weaknesses in the Government's case and additional reasons why
judicial precedents and sound policy argue against the Government's
defense of non-liability for profits claimed by Bethlehem.
The full title of the Fleet Corporation, it is important to recall, is the
United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation. This cor-
porate entity was not created directly by Congress, nor was it chartered
by the Federal Government. The USSBEFC was created under the
general corporation laws of the District of Columbia in accordance with
authority emanating from Congress to the President and by him trans-
ferred to the new corporate entity.69 The exact legal status of USSBEFC
was clearly developed by Justice Holmes in the leading case of Sloan
Shipyards Corporation v. United States Shipping Board Emergency
Fleet Corporation:
"The Shipping Act contemplated a corporation in which private persons
might be stockholders and which was to be formed like any business corporation
under the laws of the District [of Columbia], with capacity to sue and be sued.
The United States took all the stock but that did not affect the legal position
of the company."70
Dismissing the argument that the tremendous powers given to the Fleet
Corporation by way of Congressional enactment placed it in the position
of the sovereign and allowed it to share the immunity of the sovereign
from suit, Justice Holmes concluded that the Fleet Corporation could
67. G. B. at 85-86.
68. Frankfurter, J., at 601n.
69. Supra, note 31.
70. 258 U. S. 549, 565 (1922). Italics added. This method of incorporating a Federal
agency under ordinary corporation statutes is not exceptional. Olson v. United States
Spruce Production Corporation, 267 U. S. 462 (1925).
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be sued even in State courts and that the immunity of the sovereign to
suit could not be invoked by its separate corporate agency.
71
This basic principle, which denied to the Fleet Corporation the proce-
dural protection which is extended to the United States, has since been
frequently affirmed. 72 In Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corpora-
tion,73 Justice Frankfurter traced the advantages to Government which
followed the creation of such separate corporate entities.74  Replying
to the same contention raised by the Government in the Sloan Shipbuild-
ing case, that these corporate arms of the sovereign were immune from
suit because of their performance of Governmental work, the following
striking language was used in the Keifer case: " . . . the government
does not become the conduit of its immunity in suits against its agents
or instrumentalities merely because they do its work."'7 5
Translating the principles of the Sloan Shipbuilding and Keifer cases
regarding the nature and status of the Fleet Corporation into the Beth-
lehem case, it is submitted that the entire development of separate cor-
porate agencies76 and "Authorities ' 77 of Government, Federal or State,
legally and equitably renders strong support to the position of Justice
Black and the concurring Justices in the principal case. It is pertinent
to recall that the thirteen contracts involved in the Bethlehem litigation
were signed by the "United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Cor-
poration" and the "Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corporation, Ltd." It is
true that the abstraction, "United States of America", did not physically
affix its signature to these contracts nor was it written down by any of
its corporate subsidiaries or their officials.7 But this fact, it now ap-
71. Sloan Shipyards v. United States Fleet Corporation, 258 U. S. 549, 568 (1922).
72. Keifer v. R. F. C. 306 U. S. 381 (1939); United States v. Shaw, 309 U. S. 495
(1940); Federal Housing Administration v. Burr, 309 U. S. 242 (1940).
73. 306 U. S. 381 (1939).
74. Id. at 390, 391.
75. Id. at 388.
76. Thurston, Government Proprietary Corporations (1935) 21 VA. L. R-v. 351, 465;
Field, Government Corporations: A Proposal (1935) 48 HARv. L. REv. 775; Keifer v.
R. F. C. supra, note 73 at 390n.
77. See informative articles by E. H. Foley, Jr., General Counsel of the United States
Treasury, stressing the advantages to the Government in the creation and use of "Authori-
ties" in the States and Municipalities. Foley, Some Recent Developments in the Law
Relating to Municipal Financing of Public Works (1935) 4 FoRa.EAm L. Rxv. 13; The Case
of Tierney v. Cohen (1936) 5 FoRD~ma L. REv. 73; Legal Aspects of Low-Rent Housing
in New York (1937) 6 FORDnnA L. REV. 1.
78. The contracts were made between Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corporation, Ltd. (a
subsidiary of Bethlehem Steel Corporation) and the "United States Shipping'Board Emer-
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pears, does not help the cause of the Fleet Corporation by permitting it
to hide behind the broad mantle of sovereign power. The Fleet Corpor-
ation-a sort of "emancipated child"" of the parent Government-is
"(on its own" and is properly suable on its contracts, subject generally
to the operation of orthodox contract law."° Having descended to the
market place"' and elected to enter into a face-to-face, (or corporation-
to-corporation) bargain with another private corporation, the juristic
barrier voluntarily erected by the parent Government should not now
be removed in aid of the Fleet Corporation.
Here is a legalistic argument which at first blush may seem to rest
upon a tenuous and fine-spun distinction between the United States
and its authorized agencies. But it is well to recall that there may be
gency Fleet Corporation, a corporation organized under the laws of the District of Colum-
bia (herein called the Owner), representing the United States of America, party of the
second part." The contracts were signed by "Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corporation, Ltd.,"
and the "United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation" (R. 109 et seq.).
Even if the contracts were signed: "United States of America, by United States Fleet
Corporation," it seems that the contracts would still be construed to be the contracts of the
Fleet Corporation, not of the "United States of America". Sloan Shipyards Corporation,
supra, note 70 at 568; Dietrich v. U. S. S. B. Emergency Fleet Corporation, 9 F. (2d) 733
(1925), cert. denied, 278 U. S. 647 (1928); U. S. S. B. Emergency Fleet Corporation v.
Tabas, 22 F. (2d) 398 (1927).
79. It is not intended to drive the textual analogy of "emancipated child" too far, but
it is worth noting that the legal consequences attaching to the status of an emancipated
child are not unlike the enlarged rights and responsibilities of the separate corporate off-
springs of the Federal Government. For a carefully developed treatment of the status
of the "emancipated child", see Justice Shientag's opinion in Cohen v. Delaware, L. & W.
R. Co., 150 Misc. 450, 269 N. Y. Supp. 667 (1934).
80. There are unquestionably sizable remnants of the idea of the sovereign still present
in the legal status of these corporate entities. Thurston, supra, note 76, at 485, 502;
Field, supra, note 76, passim. But the over-all picture seems to be one of a gradual dimi-
nution of sovereign power. Indeed, Thurston concludes his scholarly survey of the problem
with a wise paradox: "In the law of government pr6prietary corporations, the public
interest is best served by regarding them as private". Supra, note 76 at 503. (Italics added.)
The use of the term "proprietary" in connection with the discussion of the Fleet Corpo-
ration has been avoided because we believe that it is a border-line classification, when
applied to an emergency corporation functioning in wartime. Doubtless Thurston, and
probably Field, would classify the Fleet Corporation as a proprietary one because of the
nature of its activities, its charter, etc. Thurston, supra, note 76, passim; Field, supra,
note 76, passint.
81. "If it [Government] comes down from its position of sovereignty, and enters the
domain of commerce, it submits itself to the same laws that govern individuals there."
Cooke v. United States, 91 U. S. 389, 398 (1875), cited with approval in United States v.
Rockland Bank, 35 F. Supp. 912, 914 (1940).
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good dogma as well as "bad dogma". 2 Here is a chance to test out one
of the most elusive abstractions in the law-the magic words which give
corporate life by means of a formalistic ritual-and inquire whether the
separate Governmental entities, upon solid grounds of practicality and
realism, should be allowed to hide behind the mighty sovereign which
gave them life. If space permitted, it would be interesting to relate
this juristic insulation, which severs the United States from its multiple
corporate agencies, to the entire area now occupied by administrative
bodies. Suffice it to say that the Governmental policy of creating cor-
porations and "Authorities" was not inaugurated in order to strait-
jacket the Government, but was voluntarily undertaken to aid mate-
rially in furthering its proper and expanding functions.8" The so-called
"Fourth Department" of Government was instituted because the use
of the corporate "abstraction" brought with it many advantages, paral-
leled-let it be remembered-by many responsibilities not ordinarily
assumed by the State.
In this setting it is well to recall the closing words of Justice Murphy
in his concurring opinion:
"It cannot be left out of consideration that the Government entered into
the agreements with full understanding of their terms. Surely there is much
82. "Give a bad dogma a good name, and its bite may become as bad as its bark."
Frank, J., in Kulukundis Shipping Company v. Amtorg Trading Corporation, United
States Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, decided March 2, 1942, Unofficial Report,
879, 889. Another gem from the same case: "[Lord] Campbell, here as elsewhere, was
distinctly not Coke-eyed." Id. at 887.
The advent of Judge Jerome Frank to the Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit,
one year ago, has been followed by a new style in judicial writings. His opinions are
adorned with a sparkling verve in which to package his sweeping surveys of authoritarian
law and with a versatile display of extra-legal citations unique in current juridical output.
Critics of legal philosophy who have oft repeated the aphorism--"Jursprudence bakes no
bread"-are now warned that this dogma, like many another dogma, must be revised in
the light of Judge Frank's interesting contributions to juristic literature. (Supra, notes
59, 66.) An erstwhile critic may venture his tentative opinion that there is appearing
in Judge Frank's legal philosophy a somewhat broader and more judicial attitude, a less
authoritarian point of view than he evidenced, for example, in LAW AND THE MODERN
MiND (1931) Ch. VII, VIII, XII, XVIII.
Concededly in these days of war and economic distress, the lowly pun serves a laudable
purpose and makes lighter the load of the depressed lawyers. To add a permissible gloss
to Judge Frank's humorous turn-about-phrase taken from the maxim anent canine be-
havior: A good dogma, let it be remembered, like a good dog, is "man's best friend" and is
not harmed (or helped) by unconsidered and unscientific name-calling. See Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, 62 Sup. Ct. 766 (1942); see note 94, infra.
83. Supra, note 76.
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to be said in favor of the Government's standing behind obligations, even
though quite onerous, which it incurred with knowledge of the circumstantes.
The possibility that the Government may be relieved of bargains twenty-four
years after agreeing to them is not conducive to mutual trust and confidence
between citizens and their government."
8 4
These apt words take on additional force when we consider the nature,
origin and purposes of the Fleet Corporation, the designated Govern-
mental agency authorized to enter into the shipbuilding contracts with
Bethlehem.
It is respectfully submitted that both precedent and sound policy
argue against the position of the Government in its present attempt to
recapture the discarded mantle of sovereign power. Principle and prac-
ticality unite in support of the Court's valiant adherence to the integrity
of Governmental obligations, absent fraud, duress, collusion oi other
legal principle invalidating its engagements with citizen or corporation.
Judicial Review of Governmental "Policies"
One of the enigmas of the Bethlehem Steel case is the strange mixture
of confusion and agreement which threads through the prevailing opinion
of Justice Black and the dissenting opinion of Justice Frankfurter re-
garding the judicial power of the Supreme Court to review legislative or
executive discretiohi in the matter of the wartime "policies" entering into
the shipbuilding contracts in the principal case. The confusion arises
because all of the six Justices are seemingly in substantial agreement
that the Supreme Court should not interfere by substituting its own
judgment on the issues of legislative wisdom or administrative expedi-
ency; nor should the Court act as a Super-legislature in the appraisal of
Governmental discretion.
The striking parallel between the prevailing Justices and the dis-
senting Justice may be evidenced by the placement of their considered
statements in opposite columns:
Justice Black says: Justice Frankfurter says:
"The futility of subjecting this "If the history of this Court per-
choice of policy to judicial review mits one generalization above all
is demonstrated by this case, com- others, it is the unwisdom of entering
ing to this Court as it does more than the domain of policy outside the very
twenty years after the ships were narrow legal limits presented by the
completed. In any event, we believe record of a particular litigation. Such
the question of whether or not this intrusion into the executive and legis-
84. Murphy, J., at 593.
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policy was wise is outside our prov- lative domains is not conducive to
ince to decide. Under our form of the just disposition of the immedi-
government we do not have the pow- ate controversy. We are much less
er to nullify it, as we believe we likely to go wrong if we do not de-
should necessarily be doing, were we part from the well-grooved path of
to declare these contracts unenforce- judicial competence." 6
able on the ground that profits grant-
ed under Congressional authority
were too high."85
Thus it seems that the Court and the minority Justice are expressing
very similar views on a judicial "hands-off" policy in the matter of re-
view of Congressional and Executive action; both Justice Black and
Justice Frankfurter invoke the same caveat of the "unwisdom of enter-
ing the- domain of policy" in support of their antagonistic positions in the
Bethlehem Steel case.
One may well pause before, attempting to solve the semantic riddle
regarding "policy" and confess that the true solution of this strange
blending of judicial accord and discord must await the skilled probing
of our cranial legalists who specialize in the psychical art of explaining
how and why judges decide cases.8 7  But the conventional commentator
(while awaiting the ipse dixit of the legal psychologists) may be per-
mitted to venture his opinion with due humility regarding the substan-
tive merits of the double use of judicial "let-alone-ism" in the instant
case. , How do the dual admissions of the futility or unwisdom of sub-
jecting legislative and executive policy to the appraisal of the Justices
of the Supreme Court fit into the contrasted positions of the prevailing
and minority opinions in the Bethlehem litigation?
It seems that the logic of Justice Black's opinion justifies his conten-
tion that the policies of the Government have been fixed and predeter-
mined by Congress, the President and the Fleet Corporation, and that
the United States is now asking its judicial arm to revise the contracts
framed in accord with the sweeping war powers, transferred by the
Congress to the Fleet Corporation via the President." Acting within
85. Black, J., at 591.
86. Frankfurter, J., at 604; id. at 593.
87. This process of judicial probing is considered in the writer's papers: Psychologism in
the Law (1940) 29 GEO. L. J. 139; Portrait of a Realist, New Style (1941) 10 FoRDHAM
L. REV. 196.
88. It is necessary to separate, as far as possible, the parallel and somewhat overlapping
problems of "duress" and "policy" in the Bethlehem case. The stated question of "policy"
is a narrow one: Who is "entering the domain of policy" in his' judicial opinion-ustice
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the broad limits of the granted Congressional powers, the Fleet Corpor-
Black, Justice Murphy, Justice Douglas or Justice Frankfurter? Otherwise stated, who is
asking for a judicial review of the "policies" which culminated in the specific contracts in
question? These are the questions which come out of the dispute as to "policy" set forth
in the text-quotations from the Bethlehem case.
Concededly, if duress against Fleet Corporation is proved according to law, then mat-
ters of Governmental policy become of secondary importance. It may also be conceded
that Congress did not intend to sanction "unconscionable contracts" which are contrary
to law. (Frankfurter, J., at p. 603.) But the difficulty with the maintenance of the
claim of "duress" is that it cannot be raised, much less established, without a review and
evaluation of the Governmental "policies" of Congress, the President and the Fleet Corpo-
ration. Moreover, such policies of the Fleet Corporation call for a comparison with con-
trasted "policies" in other Departments of Government in time of war. At the moment,-
let it be carefully noted, it is not necessary to consider the soundness or sufficiency of
these comparisons of "policy". It suffices to point out that these evaluations of policy
formed, and must form, the core of the Government's case against Bethlehem and of the
learned Justice's dissent.
In the course of his scholarly opinion, Justice Frankfurter says: "We know that the
policy of the Navy Department with respect to so-called straight cost-plus shipbuilding
contracts was to allow profits of 10% of actual cost." (Frankfurter, J., at 602. Italics
added.) Again the Justice says: "We know that, similarly, the policy of the War Depart-
ment with respect to cost-plus contracts for the construction of cantonments was to allow
profits not exceeding 10% of cost." (Id. at 602. Italics added.)
True, Justice Black was obliged to answer this tender of comparative "policies" prac-
ticed by the Navy and War Departments during World War I. His answer is that these
excursions into the familiar "straight cost-plus shipbuilding contracts" are not only irrele-
vant but in fact add weight to the reasonableness of the stated price-formula used by the
Fleet Corporation in making the Bethlehem contracts. Justice Black invades the area of
"policy" not for the purpose of altering it, but to justify the "hands-off" attitude of the
prevailing Justices throughout the Bethlehem decision. A few brief quotations from the
learned opinion of Justice Black seem to fortify this contention. Justice Black says:
"To establish a standard of customary profits, the petitioner points to the experience
of the Navy and War Departments and other branches of the government in connection
with straight cost plus contracts ...The relevance of experience with cost plus contracts
to the contracts here is not clear. The Shipping Board deliberately chose to avoid cost
plus contracts where possible, having found them unsatisfactory in practice ... experience
in many fields has demonstrated that the percentage of profit actually realized under cost
plus contracts is likely to be far more than the percentage specified.;' (Black, J., at 590.)
Thus it appears that Justice Black enters the "domain of policy" solely for the purpose
of answering the learned dissenting Justice who has seemingly raised the issue of comparable
"policies" of other Government Departments during World War I. The opinions of the
Court make clear that they are not acting as a "Super-legislature", nor do they contend
that the "policies" of Government herein developed meet with their unqualified approval
on the questions of legislative wisdom or administrative expediency. They are content to
justify the stated actions of Government on the ground that they were reasonable under
the circumstances; that they did not offend any Constitutional or legal principle; and
that their decisions in favor of Bethlehem should not be construed as an indorsement of
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ation, alter ego of the Chief Executive, decided after due deliberation to
forego its right and power to commandeer shipbuilding plants, or to
purchase ships at a reasonable price subject to judicial revision in the
event that the seller regarded the price as unfair."9
Turning back to the tempestuous times of the World War I and limit-
ing, in so far as possible, our present judgment to the available data and
the powers of prevision given to the officials of the Fleet Corporation ih
1917-1918, a justiciable question is hardly present in the review of the
"policies" of these mortal men in their decision to build ships after free
negotiation, rather than under force of Government operation of plants,
or unilateral price-fixing subject to judicial review. Sad to state it, we
are today able to observe similar questions of "policy" and the diverse
and conflicting views regarding the relations of Government, industry
and labor in time of war. ° Twenty-five years have elapsed since the
the Governmental policies or business morals which permitted the profits in the principal
case. (Black, J., at 591; Murphy, J., at 592.)
89. The issues of "policy" and "duress" do not "date" merely from the time the officers
of Bethlehem and Fleet Corporation began their negotiations. Long before they started,
Congress, The President and the Fleet Corporation had many knotty questions of policy
to decide, not the least of which was the comparative advantages of Government capture
and operation versus arms-length bargaining. It could hardly be argued that Bethlehem
compelled or even participated in these preliminary decisions. Cf. supra, note 31, 33.
90. Another unusual feature of the Bethlehem case is the recurrence today of the same
problem of Governmental policies in wartime which faced the Congress, President Wilson
and the Fleet Corporation in 1917-1918.
It suffices to state that one need not look beyond the pages of the daily press to realize
the multiple, complex and varied solutions, pending or proposed, regarding war profits,
wages or prices.
Herein may be mentioned the emphasis upon production, maximum speed and maximum
volume by the War Production Board; the curtailment of competitive bidding in military
supply contracts; the substitution of the negotiated contract system for competitive bidding
to permit the entry of small manufacturers into war production even though the result
is higher costs; the construction of experimental war vessels, like the "Sea Otter", without
concern about immediate costs.
These items taken from the daily press (March 4, 1942-April 1, 1942) indicate ciearly
that such delicate decisions of "policy" properly reside in the Congressional and Executive
Departments of Government rather than in the Supreme Court.
Turning briefly to the question of war profits we find the following diverse opinions:
Senator Walsh of Massachusetts proposes that the United States recapture all profits above
6%. The N\Tew York Times objects on the ground that a contractor might turn his invest-
ment over twenty times in a year and thus run his annual profit up well above 100%.
Under-Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson makes the same general argument before
the House Naval Affairs Committee. The United Automobile Workers Union proposes that
legislation be enacted limiting war production profits to 3%. Others argue for a sliding
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policy-making decision of the officers of the Fleet Corporation, yet today
(April 1, 1942) Congress is still debating the many competitive plans
for fixing war profits and erecting a ceiling over wages. The President
and his many Executive agencies are facing similar vexatious questions
of maximum "all-out" production versus minimum profits and maximum
efficiency of labor. This inevitable uncertainty and necessary flexibility
of Government policy, understandable in time of war and under our
democratic freedom of discussion, is of value when we turn back the
pages of history a quarter of a century and consider the wisdom of the
exercise by the Supreme Court of a veto power over administrative acts
performed in the haste and complexities of preparation for waging an
effective and speedy war in defense of our institutions. 9'
Whether we consider .the stated issue of "policy", which divides the
Justices in the Bethlehem case, from the viewpoint of World War I, or
World War II; or even under the judicial "let-alone" formula originated
by Justice Holmes, 2 the jural architect who first outlined the specifica-
schedule of profits or the vigorous use of the excess profits tax. The same complexity
reigns with reference to the regulation of the hours and wages of labor. (Daily press,
passim.)
One of the most significant of present-day "policies" is that a form of contract some-
what similar to the "half-savings" clause, which is the focal point of attack by the Gov-
ernment in the Bethlehem case, is still defended by Government officials, and in fact empha-
sized, as a desirable form of war contract in certain cases.. See the discussion of the
"target-cost" contracts in Investigation of the Naval Defense Program, PRELIMINARY
REPORT OF THE COM ITTEE ON NAvAL AFFAIRS, H. R. REP. No. 1634, PART II, 112-115.
91. The reasonableness of the preliminary decision of Fleet Corporation to elect free
bargaining rather than compulsory seizure of the shipbuilding plants finds additional sup-
port out of the parallel experience of the Government in the operation of the railroads
during World War I. SPLAwN, GOvERNMNT OWNERSHIP AND OPERATION OF RAILROADS
(1928) ch. XVII-XVIII; LoREE, RAILRoAD FREIGHT TRANSPORTATION (1929) Foreword;
DLxON, RAILROAD AND GOVERNMENT (1922) Ch. X; JOHNSON, GOVERNMENT REGuLATION OF
TRANSPORTATION (1938) Ch. I; PROBLEMS IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1940)' 123-126.
For an able defense of the experiment of Government operation of railroads in war-
time, see HINEs, WAR HISTORY OF AMERICAN RAILROADS (1928) passim. It is of course true,
as Hines states, that the experiment of Government operation of railroads in wartime
is not a fair test to determine the broader question of the advantages or disadvantages of
Government ownership in normal times. Perhaps it is worth noting that there is no insistent
demand today for a repetition of the World War I experiment in Government management
of the railroads, any more than there is for the operation of shipbuilding plants by the
Federal Government. The intangible factors leading to these decisions are more numerous
than the alleged recalcitrance or unwillingness of the shipbuilders to cooperate in com-
pulsory operation. Frankfurter, J., at 594; cf. Black, J., at 589.
92. Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45 (1905) Holmes, dissenting at 74; Adkins v.
Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525 (1923) Holmes, dissenting at 567; Hammer v. Dagen-
hart, 247 U. S. 251 (1918) Holmes dissenting at 277.
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tions of the current "hands-off" policy of the new Court-by any or all
these tests, it seems that the prevailing opinions of the Supreme Court
in the Steel case exhibit a wise and restricted exercise of judicial revalu-
ation of Governmental "policies" in wartime.
A Bit of Realism
Our realist reformers repeatedly warn us against the evils of juristic
complacency and exalt the joys of purposeful experiment and amelior-
ating changes in the rules and principles of classical law. Here indeed
is one of the great accomplishments of the New Constitutionalism: a
willingness to revalue old concepts and past dogmas in Constitutional
law in the light of the socio-economic problems of present-day society.
Justice Holmes, in an oft-quoted passage, states the functional position
in his scintillating style:
"It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it
was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the
grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule
simply persists from blind imitation of the past.19 3
Accepting with footnoted reservationse4 the validity of the Holmesian
critique directed against the standpattism of traditional law, there are
signs aplenty that legal reformers are not always observant of the re-
strictive language carefully incorporated into his wise comment. Fre-
quently no adequate examination is made into the preliminary question
of whether there are "better" reasons for a rule of law than its mere
longevity. Their favorite pragmatic formula "try anything once" may
necessitate an occasional gloss. In practice it sometimes assumes an
altered form: "Try anything once-and at once-and repent at leisure"!
Instances may be cited where realist scholars propose a vital change in
bread-and-butter principles of law without adequate consideration of
93. HoLM s, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS (1920) 187.
94. The text quotation from Holmes has frequently been used as a "spring-board" for
a broadside attack against sterile dogma, elusive abstractions, illusory precedents, etc., etc.
One gains the impression from some of his present-day disciples, that the adjectival pre-
fixes are merely added to characterize the inherent nature of legal concepts, principles and
standards, if not in fact to question their validity or utility.
A natural query arises: Are all legal abstractions and concepts inherently bad? Cf.
RODELL, WOE UNTO You, LAWYERS! (1939); C.ASE, Round and Round with the Judges,
THE TYRANNY or WORDS (1938) Ch. XVIII; McDougal, Fuller v. The American Legal
Realists: An Intervention (1941) 50 YALE L. J. 827, 836n. For a current estimate of the
status of "dogma", see Ayres, Book Review (1942) 51 YALE L. J. 881-882.
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their favorite test of "results and consequences". Frequently adherents
to the common-law doctrine have been able to demonstrate, out of the
actual analysis of realists' writings, that the ancient principle of law
under attack is not only conceptually defensible but is preferable, on the
plane of practicality, to the proposed change 5
The Bethlehem case furnishes an excellent example of the importance
of considering carefully the remote as well as the immediate conse-
quences of a clear departure from uniform and ancient precedents of
the common law. An examination of past experiences may aid us in
determining whether there is a "better reason" for the conclusions
reached by the Supreme Court than the mere age and drab uniformity
of the legal authorities invoked by Justice Black and the concurring
Justices.
History Revisited
We are naturally prone to believe, especially in these trying days,
that our political, economic and social problems are something entirely
new, arising principally during the Depression Decade of 1930-1940,
and therefore demand new attempts at "planned economy" which are
the discoveries of our own genius. History warns that there are rich
mines of experience to be reopened and reexamined before we conclude
that all of the trials and tribulations of our day are entirely new and
must call for new remedies. It may be well to recall that "ceilings" on
prices, wages and profits are as old as the common law. We should be
reminded that the Ordinance of Labourers, enacted in 1349, was in effect
a "ceiling" on wages and provided that the old wages, and no more
should be paidY6 The history of legislation in our own country, begin-
ning with the colonial era, indicates that similar attempts have been
made to erect ceilings on wages in Massachusetts as early as 1632,91
and later in New York and in our times, in Kansas0
8
95. Cf. my articles dealing with specific realists (Felix S. Cohen) supra, note 43;
(Arnold) Realism, What Next? I (1938) 7 Foa n.n L. REv. 203; (Eno) Realism, What
Next? II (1939) 8 FoRDHAm L. REv. 45; (Hamilton) Portrait of a Realist, New Style
(1941) 10 Foo.HAm L. REv. 196; (Rodell, et alii) Psychologism in the Law (1940) 29 GEo.
L. J. 139, 154-156.
96. 23 Edward I1 (1349). See Kennedy, Discretion in Industrial Law (1926) 1
THouGHT 399, 405, for a discussion of early labor laws in England and colonial America.
Holdsworth gives many examples of the enactment of legislative "ceilings" on prices in
the early common law. 2 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY or ENGLisH LAW (1927) 390; 4 HOLDS-
woRTH, id. at 375-377; 6 HotDswoRTH, id. at 306, 346.
97. 1 WIEy-RINES, TrE UNITED STATES (1912) 249.
98. Kennedy, Ldw and the Railroad Labor Problem (1923) 32 YALE L. J. 553, 556-557.
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This excursion into Anglo-American attempts to regulate labor is of
material value in our present endeavor to localize the policy-making
powers of Government. Recalcitrant and unwilling "traders" and "la-
bourers" did not first come forth as a result of present-day economic
conditions or wartime emergencies. But most important of all, for pur-
poses of determining the realistic aspects of Governmental "policies" in
the Bethlehem case, this series of legislative experiments and restrictive
acts of Government indicates that the wisdom or expediency of attempts
to fix profits, prices and wages should reside in the Congress and/or in
the President; it calls for the exercise of wise, flexible and changing dis-
cretion rather than for the belated operation of judicial review by the
Supreme Court twenty-five years after the event. 9
Here is one problem of Government which is not "dated": Human
nature in England in the days of King Edward III, in the Massachusetts
Bay Colony, in New York, in Kansas and in America in 1918 argues for
the soundness and wisdom of the prevailing opinions of the Supreme
Court in United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corporation in 1942.
Once more we may invoke the aid of American history to point a
warning against the remote consequences of precipitate expansion of
settled common law doctrine under pressure of extenuating circum-
stances present in a particular piece of litigation. A glance into the past
lends support to the contention of the Court that a Government contract
should spell out a promise and not a mere "prediction".' 00 History
sometimes has a way of repeating itself; at least history deserves to be
repeated to warn against the ready acceptance of the novel principle
that a mighty Government or its authorized agencies may be subject
to duress in the making of war contracts. Consider the deplorable epi-
sode of the French Spoliation Claims " . . . which for many decades
occupied the attention of appropriation committees of Congress and
wore out their patience, with- results that have put in the hearts of
claimants a deep sense of the injustice of Governments".'
99. It is in order to recall that there is no dispute between the six Justices about the
residual powers of Congress under the Constitution to fix the policies governing war
contracts. Supra, notes 42, 48.
100. ". . . I am one of those who believe that a promise is something more than what
it is fashionable nowadays to consider it; that it is something more than a mere predic-
tion." Pound, Address to the Judicial Section of the New York State Bar Association,
64 REPORT OF NEW YORK STATa BAR AssOCIATION (1941) 525.
101. Taft, J., dissenting in Sloan Shipyards v. United States Fleet Corporation, 258
U. S. 549, 573 (1922).
The French Spoliations incident deserves retelling to prove that a Government may not
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A study of the French Spoliation Claims, destructive of the obligatory
relations of Government to citizen, lends force to the concluding state-
ment of Justice Murphy that the Bethlehem contracts should be en-
forced "unless there are valid and appropriate reasons known to the
law for relieving it [Government] from its obligations."" °2
IV
CONCLUSION
The solemn warnings by eminent judges'0 3 that well-settled rules of
law should not be lightly tossed aside certainly cannot with any accu-
racy be directed to the exhaustive coverage of legal analogies and fac-
only be powerful, but delinquent, in performing its monetary obligations with resultant
hardship to its citizens.
On October 25,. 1803, Congress passed an act which provided for the payment of
$3,750,000 to citizens of the United States holding claims against France, arising out of
French depredations committed before 1801. This sum was assumed by the United States
as part of the price paid for Louisiana. The action of the United States Government pre-
vented United States claimants from exercising their rights to prosecute their claims against
France, and substituted their own country as the debtor nation. From 1803 to 1885, these
claims were presented year after year and reported favorably over forty times by the
Congressional committee, but Congress never appropriated the necessary funds, save in 1846
and 1855 when the approved bills were vetoed by Presidents Polk and Pierce respectively.
Finally in 1885, over eighty years after the original Congressional Act, the French
Spoliation Claims were transferred to the United States Court of Claims. The Court
threw out many of the claims because of insufficient, stale or defective evidence, but re-
ported favorably upon those claims that could be proved. But the necessary appropria-
tions were still withheld. On June 6, 1896, President Cleveland vetoed a bill appropriating
$1,027,314.09 as a partial payment upon these claims, but there the matter ended, and
some of the old claims were still pending in 1910, over a century after the legislative act,
implementing the treaty with France, was first passed. 4 WmEY-RmEs, TnE Uirr=n
STATES (1912) 442-443, and bibliography at 443n.
102. Murphy, J., at 592.
103. A persuasive passage, which points to the limits imposed upon judicial discretion,
is found in the dissenting opinion of justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in Northern Securities
Company v. United States. Herein the learned justice said: "Great cases, like hard cases
make bad law. For great cases are called great, not by reason of their real importance
in shaping the law of the future, but because of some accident of immediate overwhelming
interest which appeals to the feelings and distorts the judgment. These immediate inter-
ests exercise a kind of hydraulic pressure which makes what previously was clear seem
doubtful, and before which even well settled principles of law will bend." Holmes, J.,
dissenting in Northern Securities Company v. United States, 193 U. S. 197, 400 (1904).
Justice Cardozo paid Justice Holmes, his predecessor on the Supreme Court, the delicate
compliment of borrowing the thought in the stated passage and using it in an opinion
written by him while he was Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals. Cardozo,
C.J., in Matter of Doyle, 257 N. Y. 244, 268, 177 N. E. 489, 498 (1931).
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tual data provided in Justice Frankfurter's learned dissent. The schol-
arly jurist is a worthy successor of his mentor, Justice Holmes, in his
able presentment of a cause which is much broader than the confines
of a single case. Justice Frankfurter advances to a long-range and
reasoned presentment of a judicial principle to be applied in the con-
tractual relations of Government and citizen in wartime. His juristic
vision sweeps the horizon and he offers in his concluding paragraphs a
general formula which should be applied in evaluating the relations exist-
ing between contractors and Government in time of war.
Justice Frankfurter says:
"During wartime the bargaining position of Government contracting officers
is inherently weak, no matter how conscientious they may be. If they are to
deal on equal terms with private contractors, particularly where the subject
matter of contracts is so intricate and so specialized as the building of ships,
they must have available to them not only detailed information but also the
time within which to study the data and the freedom to exercise a real choice".1 0 4
Thus it appears that the learned Justice is proposing a judicial stan-
dard of conduct which should govern the relations of the United States
and private contractors in time of war. So stated, it is apparent that the
full force of his dissent is not reached with his earlier references to the
law of duress. The expansive nature of Justice Frankfurter's judicial
formula is deducible clearly from the concluding sentences of his sum-
mation of the standards to be applied between the sovereign and sub-
ject:
"Because the Government is in such a dependent position, and because those
who deal with it on a cost-plus arrangement or some similar basis are assured
of a profit, it is wholly consistent with practicalities and makes no unduly
idealistic demand for the law to judge the arrangements of such wartime con-
tractors by standards not unlike those by which a fiduciary's conduct is judged.
Those upon whom the nation is dependent for its supplies in the defense of
its life would hardly wish to be judged by lower standards." 0 5
In this passage of his scholarly dissent, Justice Frankfurter is at his
best, a worthy successor of Justices Holmes, Brandeis and Cardozo-his
three life-long guides along the paths of the law. Beginning with the
pertinent Holmesian epigram--"Men must turn square corners when
they deal with the Government"-one sees the application of Brandeis'
ruthless pursuit of the facts in the dissenting jurist's apt relation of
104. Frankfurter, J., at 604. (Italics added.)
105. Id.
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Holmes' epigram to the World War II, a grim War in which this great
nation is involved in defense of sacred ideals and of its very existence;
and his conclusion in the stirring style of a Cardozo: "Those upon whom
the nation is dependent for its supplies in the defense of its life would
hardly wish to be judged by lower standards."
Here is a judicial dictum"6 which breaks loose from the narrow con-
fines of common-law duress, transcends the bounds of contract law,
brushes aside the materialistic morals of the market place and pleads
for a new concept of citizenship in wartime. These words, which were
received without extended comment by the Associate Justices of the
Supreme Court,10 7 may prove to be an important and durable passage of
the Bethlehem case. Unheeded for the moment in the Supreme Court,108
his inspirational appeal may yet be heard in the Halls of the Congress.
Certain it is that the above quotations deserve most careful considera-
tion before any superficial appraisal or judgment is attempted. Spatial
limitations of page and time, as well as a proper sense of humility, unite
in the reservation of judgment upon the juristic peroration of the dis-
tinguished jurist. Suffice it to say that there is dimly discernible in his
concluding utterance a number of new and important questions which
must be settled before the boundaries of the New Constitutionalism are
definitely fixed.' 9
Returning once more to the vital issues of "duress" operative against
106. Justice Frankfurter's principle of fiduciary relationship was offered at the end of
his lengthy opinion. It is noteworthy that be expresses his fiduciary principle in negative
form: the relations between Government and contractor in wartime are ". . . not unlike
those by which a fiduciary's conduct is judged." There is no indication that he is in-
sisting upon exact conformity of the obligations of war contractors with all the duties of
a fiduciary.
107. The closest approach to a discussion of the fiduciary-relation principle seems to
be found in Justice Black's brief rejection of the Government's claim of "unconsciona-
bility" of Bethlehem's conduct in the matter of excessive profits. Black, J., at 590.
108. Supra, notes 44, 45.
109. The development of the fiduciary-relation status reinforces Justice Frankfurter's
earlier contention that Government enjoys what might be called jural "exemptions" in
situations where citizens or corporations might be bound. (Frankfurter, J., at 591 and
591n.)
But many more penetrating issues are visible in the background: (1) the return of the
problem of "liberty of contract" which vexed the Supreme Court for many years; (2) the
revival of Maine's classic question, contract to status? which has been a lively subject of
late in jurisprudence and in judicial decisions. [See, for example, SEAGLE, THE QUEsT rOR
LAW (1941) ch. XVII; Hume v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 121 F. (2d) 336, 342-345
(1941).]; (3) the query whether the proposal of Justice Frankfurter falls within the
province of the judicial power, or belongs in the legislative area of the Federal Government.
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Government and of judicial review of Governmental "policies", which
permeate the Bethlehem case and form the major part of the present
paper, and limiting our tentative conclusions to the stated points, it is
respectfully submitted that principle and practicality, precedent and
public policy, history and human nature, Constitutional and common
law-all lend substantial support to the decision of the Supreme Court
on these controversial items in United States v. Bethlehem Steel Cor-
poration.
(To be concluded)
